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TRAVELING WITH DE BEAUVOIR FROM INDIA
I canle to The Second Sex at seventeen in the last year of my
schooling in 1989, which was in Bombay. It was the year before lieft
to study literature and philosophy at a smallliberal arts college, a
women'ls college, in the V.S. My recollections of school-days seem to
be dominated by that year, for I suppose everything must have been
marked by the exhilaration of a first leave-taking from the places of a
fortunate childhood. It was in this year that I found myself in
possession of a copy of The Second Sex. (I remember reading it on
certain desultory summer afternoons when I was assigned to the
reception-desk at the non-profit organization where my best friend and
I volunteered our time. It was Parshley' s English translation; I grew up
in abilingual family, at horne in Bengali and English). The book was
my mother'ls, from her university days in London, and it was ferreted
from the bookshelves at horne. In reflecting on the significance of
Beauvoir' s text for me today, then, I take that time as my starting point.
I am in the first place, my mother'ls daughter. She was a
product of that post-Independence generation of "midnight'schildren"
(whose aspirations Rushdie made known in his celebrated troping of a
national awakening) and to which the horizon of my intellectual and
political imagination remains indebted. They were the children of an
English-speaking Indian elite, born immediately after the achievement
of freedom from the British Raj. Their inheritance was avision of
secularism and the democratic commitment to social justice within the
legal framework of a liberal state. The ambivalence of Rushdie's trope,
however, gestures to the underbelly of this national imagining; it
continues to mirror, for post-independent elites, Nehru's own originary
equivocation at the moment of anational founding. A "redemption" of
freedom, indeed, but only at the midnight hour, the same moment in
which Pakistan individuated itself out of the body of a liberated India.
Emancipation and the possibilities of self-articulation -- the
moment of the liberal Indian nation-state -- was inseparable from the
immediate history of communal violence. In the Nehruvian narrative, a
nationalist elite "rescued" the promise of the enlightenment from its
instantiation in empire, recalling Western philosophy' s foundational
claim about the necessary and historical connection of reason to
freedom. But enlightenment entailed forgetfullness, and so Nehru's
eloquent hesitation should continue to suggest that a "people" are
constituted in the light of their historical distinction only after they have
been thrown, as it were, out of an originary, insensible "0 hour". The
Partition of India involved the largest migration of a population in the
twentieth century, sectarian violence, and mass dispossession. It should
be emphasised -- as Indian feminists consistently have -- that the
experience of such dislocation was represented and enacted through the
bodies of women. Forced migrations were accompanied by the
abduction of Muslim and Hindu women to the "wrong" side of the
national dividing-lines, by rape and the mutliation of women's bodies
(tattooed, as I am told they were, with the signs of the autonomous
nation). And afterwards, widowhood would haunt the edges of new
borders.
It was not as if my mother's generation were unaware of this
double legacy: she, like the children of so many others, was
immediately related to those who had been involved first in the
brutalities of the anti-colonial struggle and then, as professional and
bureaucratic elites, in the difficult decisions of nation-building. But a
vocal metropolitan intelligentsia, even if comfortable in their passages
in and out of a vernacular idiom, had always spoken to politics in the
tongue that took liberalism to be a second-nature. Communalism was a
deep possibility, certainly, but an atavistic one: the public realm of the
post-colonial nation-state, whose enlightened indifference to faith
detached it from any one denomination, would learn to work through
the traumatic history of such regressive impulses. The socio-historical
premises of an inherited belief in the compatibility of gender equality
with the tolerance of difference were never systematically evident to
me as I grew up. In this exer~ise, I re-consider my engagements with
Beauvoir' s text against these first premises, for it must be admitted that
the The Second Sex was received and bequeathed to me as a part of the
"imported" languages of the enlightenment.
At present, I am a graduate student of political theory, and my
most recent encounter with Beauvoir's text was last semester, when I
taught a course on feminist interpretations of modem western political
thought to a small and enthusiastic class of four seniors. In it, we read
sections of The Second Sex. I was struck by my recognition -- not only
of the experience described, but of the text itself -- in that passage,
where Beauvoir describes a philosophical conversation with an
anonymous male friend.
I have sometimes been annoyed in the middle of an abstract
discussion, at hearing men say to me: "You think this or that
because you are a woman"; but I know that my only defense is
to reply "I think thus and so because it is tIue", thereby
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removing my subjective self from the argument. It would be
out of the question to reply, "And you think the contrary
because you are a man", for it is understood that the fact of
being a man is no peculiarity.. .It amounts to this: just as for
the ancients, there was an absolute vertical with reference to
which the oblique was defined, so there is an absolute human
type, the masculine. Woman has ovaries, a uterus; these
peculiarities imprison her in her subjectivity, circumscribe her
within the limits ofher own nature.... [while] man superbly
ignores the fact [ofj his anatomy... He thinks of his body as a
direct and normal connection with the world, whereas he
regards the body of woman as a hindrance, a prison, weighed
down by everything peculiar to it (Parshley, xviii).
In thinking about how one could be "weighed down" in the course of
speaking by the specific peculiarities of one' s body, we saw that
Beauvoir was trapped between two false propositions. On the one side,
Beauvoir is "caught" by sinlple-minded self-confirmation: "When I
speak, I am (only) a woman. Any truth-claim I make is always only
relative ".(This description of vacuous self-confirmation reminds me of
those women who are compelled to enact their partiality constantly: in
order to speak, they refer themselves to a mitigating femininity. I think
Beauvoir describes something interesting here about the "flirt" -- a
woman who is boring, in the end, because she is without a point-of-
view). On the other side, Beauvoir faces the severity of self-denial:
"When I speak, I am not a woman". But this position is marked equally
by a lack of conviction, a loss which must accompany words that are a
consequence of any "removal of my subjectivity". Politically, it
suggests the hollowness entailed in commitments involving a
disavowal of my body. (This option is familiar to me as weIl: Beauvoir
implies that the lie-by-omission will probably not stop the woman, the
one who likes to talk about philosophy with her male friends, from
choosing such an option. In other words, she willleam to identify with
her disavowal - "I say this not because I am a woman" -- simply
because she wishes to continue to engage in conversation).
But there seemed to be, in the course of class discussion,
another alternative -- what about keeping silent? What would it mean to
feign muteness with this friend? If my own voice lies in an unspoken
space between confirmation and disavowal, I would have to show, in
the course of this exchange, that I was jaking silence -- by withdrawing
from the conversation, from the room itself, could I re-enact how my
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friend' s very solicitation to speak gags my voice ? 1 In each of these
three scenarios, however, the beginning of reflexive self-definition
occurs only at a point of resistance. Running up against the sexist
interlocutor' s decree ("you are a woman") -- this is the real starting
point of an intersubjective engagement ("conversation") in which
Beauvoir had assumed she was already involved.
The thesis I offered to my class was this. Beauvoir' s
sensibility is contemporary. She understands, by setting up the problem
between the equally unphilosophic options of confirmation and
disavowal, that the body resists a facile conflation with subjectivity.
But she also knows that the body returns to haunt any assertion of
identity (and indeed of "freedom") that would leave it behind. The
body is to be neither confirmed nor transcended: the persistence of its
meaningfulness is to be negotiated. And this repeated -- and perpetually
failing -- negotiation of the body in speech would constitute an
"authentic" conversation of friends.
As for the integrity of the third way, keeping silent, implicit
but not explored in Beauvoir' s "conversation": is the act of resisting
speech the same thing as exercising the freedom of one' s exit-option, of
choosing to walk out on a conversation? I suppose it goes to my own
constitutive experiences -- my own "background"as a certain kind of
Indian woman, now part of a diasporic community of intellectuals in
that cosmopolis, the Great American Research University -- that I am
distanced from those who whose forced muteness testifies to how they
have been silenced by the very "options" that make them who they are.
December 1992 represented a political awakening for many of
my generation. On December 6, an organized group of self-styled
Hindu militants desecrated a historical mosque, razing the 15th century
structure to the ground and inaugurating a fury of violence against
besieged Muslim communities across the Indian subcontinent. The
Indian State reacted slowly, feigning bewilderment at the actions of a
1 Toril Moi opened up this possibility in a discussion with students at
the Gothic Bookstore, Duke University, March 2000. Find a further
discussion of it in the section entitled "You Say That Because You are
a Woman", pgs. 207-226 in What is A Woman_(Oxford/New York.
1999). I assigned sections of Prof. Moi's book to my class: my own
conversation with the text is indebted to class discussions around these
assignments, most particularly to Erin Abrams ('00) and Alisa Nave
('00).
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spontaneous and irrational crowd (indeed, it was no "mob" that
demolished the Babri Masjid, as was represented in the papers); its
representatives at the level of state and local govemments responded
with undisguised partisanship, distancing themselves from even a
gesture of protection to those targeted.2
The significance of the violence lay in the extraordinary
lucidity of the nrilitants' claim, that the desecration of the religious site
was a symbolic founding, the origin of a transformed self within the
Indian nation. Hindutva (a neologisim, meaning Hindu "essence",
literally "hinduness") was to replace the secular, liberal self-
understanding of the Indian state. My discovery was not, I suppose, of
the every-day possibility of violence: for I leamt to see what I had
already known, that the post-independent Indian state has regularly
functioned as patron and vehicle to the violent excercise of social
power by clientelistic elites, men, high-castes, landowners, capitalists.
Rather, the events ofDecember 1992- January 1993 represented the
unprecedented only insofar as they marked the sudden untenablity of a
certain history of political identification. I discovered for the first time,
my full investment in the Indian state's self-designation as neutral,
tolerant and secular.
In this context -- from within the claims of a post-independent
national identity -- I am reminded that a practical politics of sexual
violence is implicit in the puzzle of verbal and interpretive coercion
that Beauvoir raises, like an inescapablity, in the insistence of the body.
Rape, legitimised by narratives of war or identity politics, has involved
2The dominant understanding of communal violence defined the events
of 1992 privately, negatively, as a regressive term of liberal secular
tolerance. This perception was pivotal in the English-speaking nation's
interpretation of the Babri Masjid affair, which was as an act of
religious intolerance precipitated by socio-economic disaffection. The
self-perception of communalists, on the other hand, vocally and
repeatedly proclaimed, remained (incredibly) a blind spot in the
discourse of "secular" moderate-Ieft positions. For communalists,
traditional religious identity functions as the denominator of warring
national communities: hence the ritualistic invocation of a traumatic
"founding" in 1947, the repeated appropriation and representation of a
mortified memory of collective violence that underwrites every
renewed assertion of national consciousness.
164
the forcible reduction of subjectivity to an image inscribed with the
identity of an (masculine, collective) other. Nothing in my political
instruction into the liberal Nehruvian values of tolerance and
secularism could have prepared me for the reports that I heard of rape
as a spectacle and ritual of nationalism;3 for extending my imagination
to women who were not victims but perpetrators in the collective
appropriation of national memories of sexual violence4; for my
speechlessness (and the inexplicable experience of profound shame)
years later, when a friend who spoke to me of the horrific reduction of
the body, that December, to the prison-house of a communal text.
It seems, then, that Beauvoir's The Second Sex must confront
the charge of obsolescence, for I have implied that the text -- in the
English translation, at least -- is the property of a (perhaps) obsolete
cultural elite. In this way, it is yet another lasting mark of the failure of
their political imagination.5 ("Obsolete" perhaps also because Beauvoir
is an essential moment in the classical "Western" project of
emancipation through self-enlightenment, even if we concede that she
reconfigures this paradigm immanently through the experiences of the
"peculiarities" of women' s bodies. It could be argued that the
reproduction of cultural and political hegemony by a nationalist elite
3Surat, 1992, where the country saw some of the worst violence.
Thirteen Muslim women were raped under floodlights. Reports that this
event was videotaped remain, as far as I know, unconfirmed.
4 According to the reports of journalist and activist Teesta Setalvad,
more than 20,000 kar sevikas were present at the site, and actively
urged on the demolition of the mosque. (Sunday Observer, January 3-
9, 1993). See also her piece "The Woman Shiv Sainik and Her Sister
Swayamsevika" in Women and the Right-Wing Movements: Indian
Experiences (eds. Tanika Sarkar and Urvashi Butalia, Zed Books:
London, 1995) In a grotesque affirmation of every-day praxis, the
militant Hindu right has appropriated the phrase kar sevak (feminine
sevika) from the Sikh religion which used it to denote, in the context of
religious service, the dignity of those who did manual labor.
5 I am aware that an abridged translation of The Second Sex exists in
Hindi. The text, as far as I know, is not taught in the philosophy
department at Delhi University, but is offered in sociology courses.
Because of the limits of my own field of research, as weIl as the fact
that I have pursued the study of philosophy outside India, I cannot
speak to whether Beauvoir has been deployed directly by practical
feminism, nor do I have the authority to speak to the ways in which her
text may have been appropriated into particular contexts.
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implies that this project failed for a "seeond" time in the eontext of
post-colonial nationhood). Beauvoir must also answer the charge of
obsolescence as levied from the side of eontemporary gender studies:
here, her insistence on the body implies an essentialism, and her
methodology reveals an inadequate theorization of gender in its resort
to "anecdotal" evidenee. My own suggestion is, however, that the text
retains a timeliness for Indian feminism in the eontext of neo-
nationalism just because of the way in whieh eontemporary theories of
subjectivity have deemed it to be dated -- Beauvoir' s text eontinues to
resist the dismissal of the body and its historieal knowledge to the
status of a contingeney.
The post-independent Indian nation defines itself along that
which Beauvoir identifies above as the aneients' prerogative: an
assumed "vertieal" (inviolable lingum) essence, ubiquitous norm of the
ehaste l-lindu male. Its opposite point is the sexuaHy predatory Muslim
male. And against this vertieal axis, emerge two tenuous trajeetories of
deviancy. Along these reside the oblique and unspeaking presenees of
Hindu and Muslim women. Here, then, would be the history of a
nation, a history of its subtext. Shame, too, must playapart in aH of
this. If I may be permitted to reeonstruet an aeeount of its trajeetory in
the terms of Beauvoir' s dialectic, I suggest that shame registers
neeessity, the way in whieh another's gaze must pass through the dark
plaees of my body. It is areminder (although never aredress) of a
strange eountry that lies between speaking and silenee, one has been
forced into the light of another's imperative.
In this context, Beauvoir's affirmation of philosophy in
experiences ofthe every-day ("1 am a woman") appears to me as
something extraordinary. Her proposition, "I am", to be understood
only by way of its qualifieation, is both modest and heroie. This self-
assertion defends the eonsisteney between the desire for "philosophie"
awakening -- self-artieulation, individuation and transformation -- and,
on the other hand, the experienee of shared histories and the praetiees
of ordinary life, the intimate knowledge of our bodies as the eondition
as weH as limit of subjeetivity. And perhaps it is the prospeet of this
very affirmation that weighs so terribly upon the psyche of the Indian
nation, bound, as it seems to be, to repeatedly foreelose its possibility,
rendering the body again, and again without impunity, into a totem for
eoHective honor and maseuline expiation.
Duke University Tania Roy
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